philipp ha scritto:non so se sia gia' stato segnalato in qualche post precedente, ma il grave incidente di Barajas ha molte analogie con quello accaduto a Detroit nel 1987 ad un altro MD80, ecco il link:
http://aviation-safety.net/go.php?http: ... R88-05.pdf
si ipotizza che l'aereo sia decollato senza la corretta configurazione di slat e flap per quel peso al decollo ,temperatura e lunghezza pista provocando un immediato irrecuperabile stallo subito dopo la rotazione.
Il motivo sembro' essere un problema di natura elettrica che provoco' la mancanza di alimentazione al sistema di "take off configuration warning" per intenderci quella bella vocina che ti urla "flap , flap , flap" o "slat , slat" etc. nelle orecchie se provi a dare manetta per il decollo senza la configurazione alare corretta.
Cosa ne pensate ?
trovate anche voi molte analogie oppure delle sostanziali differenze ?
philipp
purtroppo dopo l'analogo incidente dell' '87 a Detroit con modalita' praticamente identiche , erano state fornite le seguenti raccomandazioni da parte della NTSB alla FAA (raccomandazioni che mi ricordano, ahimé, il ritornello di una canzone di Mina del 1971, Parole, parole, parole.... ) :
"As a result of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board made the
following recommendations:
--to the Federal Aviation Administration:
Conduct a directed safety investigation to determine the reliability of circuit
breakers and the mechanisms by which failures internal to the circuit
breakers can disable operating systems and to identify appropriate
corrective actions as necessary. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-88-64)
Require the modification of the DC-g-80 series airplanes to illuminate the
existing central aural warning system (CAWS) fail light on the overhead
annunciator panel in the event of CAWS input circuit power loss so that the
airplane conforms to the original certification configuration. (Class II,
Priority Action) (A-88-65)
Develop and disseminate guidelines for the design of central aural warning
systems to include a determination of the warning to be provided, the
criticality of the provided warning, and the degree of system selfmonitoring.
(Class II, Priority Action) (A-88-66)
Require that all Parts 121 and 135 operators and principal operations
inspectors emphasize the importance of disciplined application of standard
operating procedures and, in particular, emphasize rigorous adherence to
prescribed checklist procedures. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-88-67)
Convene a human performance research group of personnel from the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, industry, and pilot groups
to determine if there is any type or method of presenting a checklist which
produces better performance on the part of user personnel. (Class II, Priority
Action) (A-88-68)
Expedite the issuance of guidance materials for use by Parts 121 and 135
operators in the implementation of team-oriented flightcrew training
techniques, such as cockpit resources management, line-oriented flight
training, or other techniques which emphasize crew coordination and
management principles. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-88-69)
69
training, or other techniques which emphasize crew coordination and
management principles. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-88-69)
Issue an Air Carrier Operations Bulletin-Part 121 directing all principal
operations inspectors to emphasize in MD-80 initial and recurrent training
programs on stall and windshear recovery the airplane’s lateral control
characteristics, potential loss of climb capability, simulator limitations, and
flight guidance system limitations when operating near the supplemental
stall recognition system activation point (stall angle of attack). (Class II,
Priority Action) (A-88-70)
--to all Part 121 Air Carriers:
Review initial and recurrent flightcrew training programs to ensure that
they include simulator or aircraft training exercises which involve cockpit
resource management and active coordination of all crewmember trainees
and which will permit evaluation of crew performance and adherence to
those crew coordination procedures. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-88-71)"
se fossero state davvero messe in pratica avrebbero, molto probabilmente, evitato questa seconda inutile strage di innocenti,
my 2 cents,
philipp