Crash RJ-85 near Medellin (Thread Tecnico)

[Ayrton]

[]

non ho capito questo appunto dei 10000ft

E' un evidenza. La montagna sulla quale si sono infilati e' alta 8570 ft.

E?

[sigmet]

E?

Faccio disegnino:

[Ayrton]

grazie del disegnino...sono cose che non ho mai visto..
il qnh mi sa che era intorno al 30.25 se non sbaglio, a quanto era settato? da procedura il fap è a 10000...

[sigmet]

grazie del disegnino...sono cose che non ho mai visto..
il qnh mi sa che era intorno al 30.25 se non sbaglio, a quanto era settato?

3042inHg =1027 Hpa

[JT8D]

"Fuel Computations

A dispatcher at a large airline together with input from The Aviation Herald computed various flight plan possibilities with respect to distances and fuel needed according to Bolivia's law. During the accident flight the enroute winds averaged at a headwind component of 4 knots.

In summary it can be said, that flights from Santa Cruz (VVI) to Medellin (MDE) or Bogota (BOG) could not have been planned legally, even if the aircraft was equipped with pannier tanks. Even in optimistic computations the computed trip fuel alone, without any taxi, contingency, diversion or reserve fuel, would have exceeded the standard fuel tank capacity (9362kg).

The dispatcher computed three different flight plans, see in detail at the PDF:

Santa Cruz-Medellin Alternate Bogota with no payload: Trip Fuel 8,660kg, Release Fuel 11,838kg
Santa Cruz-Medellin Alternate Bogota optimistic weights: Trip Fuel 9,380kg, Release Fuel 12,461kg
Santa Cruz-Bogota Alternate Medellin optimistic weights: Trip Fuel 9,260kg, Release Fuel 12,578kg

Fuel Stop Possibilities

Along the route following possibilities were checked with respect of a possible fuel stop (rounded Great Circle distances used for first leg to fuel stop and second leg to Medellin):

- Cobija (Bolivia, SLCO, 500nm+1100nm): operating from sunrise to sunset only, not open anymore at estimated time of arrival
- Tabatinga (Brazil, SBTT, 900nm+700nm): Brazil did not permit flights from Brazil to Colombia for the Bolivia registered operator, in addition the aerodrome and fuel facilities would have been closed after 23:00Z
- Leticia (Colombia, SKLT, 900nm+700nm): The airport would be open 24/7, fuel services however officially only available until 00:30Z, too tight for estimated arrival
- Bogota (Colombia, SKBO, 1500nm+100nm): as seen above not legally possible

Summary: provided an arrangement with the fuel services in Leticia could have been reached, so that refuelling would have been possible after usual service hours, Leticia would have been an ideal fuel stop."

Dettagli dei flight plans: http://avherald.com/files/lamia_flightplans.pdf

(http://avherald.com/h?article=4a16583c&opt=0)

Paolo

[Ayrton]

grazie del disegnino...sono cose che non ho mai visto..
il qnh mi sa che era intorno al 30.25 se non sbaglio, a quanto era settato?

3042inHg =1027 Hpa

era settato a tal valore o quello era il qnh?

[sigmet]

grazie del disegnino...sono cose che non ho mai visto..
il qnh mi sa che era intorno al 30.25 se non sbaglio, a quanto era settato?

3042inHg =1027 Hpa

era settato a tal valore o quello era il qnh?

SKRG 290300Z VRB02KT 9999 -DZ BKN015 SCT080 17/16 A3025

[M.Andrea]

Scusate non riesco a leggere bene la dicitura nel cerchietto rosso superiore c'è TOTAL.....e poi ? Cosa stanno a significare i dati dentro i due cerchietti rossi...?

[sigmet]

Scusate non riesco a leggere bene la dicitura nel cerchietto rosso superiore c'è TOTAL.....e poi ? Cosa stanno a significare i dati dentro i due cerchietti rossi...?

1 Tempo di volo
2 Autonomia totale

[Tiennetti]

http://correodelsur.com/seguridad/20161 ... lamia.html

Uno dei "tecnici" sopravvissuto all'incidente

Aseguró que llenó al tope con gasolina el tanque del avión y que el mismo debía realizar una parada en Cobija para reabastecerse, pero en el momento de la partida el piloto indicó que iríamos directo a Medellín. “Si el problema hubiera sido combustible, se debía al hecho de que debíamos cargar en Cobija, Yo hice facturar la gasolina hasta Cobija, pero al momento de partir me dijeron que irían directo hasta Medellín”, recordó.

Perchè riempire i serbatoi quando si prevedeva uno scalo a poco più di un'ora di volo?

[M.Andrea]

Scusate non riesco a leggere bene la dicitura nel cerchietto rosso superiore c'è TOTAL.....e poi ? Cosa stanno a significare i dati dentro i due cerchietti rossi...?

1 Tempo di volo
2 Autonomia totale

Grazie......come sia potuto passare un piano di volo così suicida non lo so proprio.....

[Ponch]

Perchè riempire i serbatoi quando si prevedeva uno scalo a poco più di un'ora di volo?

[Lampo 13]

http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2016/12 ... /?ref=fbpr

[JT8D]

"On Dec 26th 2016 Colombia's Aerocivil introduced their preliminary report in a press conference (the preliminary report itself was not released) stating, that the aircraft did not show any technical fault, there was no sabotage or suicide attempt. The evidence revealed the aircraft suffered fuel exhaustion. The crew was aware of their fuel status and considered fuel stops in Leticia (Colombia) and Bogota (Colombia), however did not decide to perform such stops. The aircraft was operated at a takeoff weight of 42,148 kg, maximum takeoff weight permitted 41,800 kg, this takeoff weight was not a factor into the accident however. According to cockpit voice recordings the first officer and observer repeatedly calculated the fuel and considered a fuel stop in Leticia but did not follow up as they did not know whether the airport was open. The aircraft features a system that activates an alarm if the fuel remaining was no longer sufficient for more than 20 minutes of flight, however, this system did not activate. 10 minutes prior to impact the crew requested priority for landing and selected the first stage of flaps. The aircraft began to turn and descend without ATC clearance causing separation problems with the other aircraft in the hold. 6 minutes prior to impact engine #3 is the first to flame out, 5 minutes prior to impact the crew selected the next stage of flaps and selected the landing gear down, the crew advised ATC ground services were not needed. Engine #2 fails. 3:45 minutes prior to impact all engines had flamed out, the aircraft was without power, the APU also failed due to lack of fuel. 2 minutes prior to impact the crew declared emergency reporting total power failure. The aircraft impacted Cerro Gordo at a speed of 230km/h (124 knots) below 9000 feet when they needed to be above 10,000 feet to safely cross the mountain".

(http://avherald.com/h?article=4a16583c&opt=0)

Paolo

[JT8D]

Rilasciato il Preliminary Report:

http://avherald.com/files/lamia_rj85_cp ... minary.pdf

Paolo

[Tiennetti]

1.9.2 Cockpit voice recorder
The CVR was successfully downloaded and recorded just over two hours of operation.
Using the recorded UTC timings from radio transmissions and the FDR, the CVR was timealigned
and revealed a recording start time of 23:08:33hrs on 28 November 2016. The
following two hours of recording was of the accident flight. The recording then ceased at
01:15:0hrs at which time the aircraft was about 550 nm from Rionegro and was one hour,
40 minutes and 45 seconds prior to the end of the FDR recording.
There was no recorded discussion about the CVR and the reason for the CVR recording
ceasing early is unknown at this stage in the investigation.

The plan gave a ground distance for the flight of 1,611 nm
and a trip fuel requirement of 8,658 kg.
The only other fuel requirement submitted to create the plan was for a taxi fuel
requirement of 200 kg. This gave a total fuel requirement for the flight of 8,858 kg, but
with no allowance for diversion, holding or contingency fuel requirements.
The plan was created using a cruising flight level of FL300 and an aircraft takeoff weight
of 32,991 kg. The plan recorded an increased trip fuel requirement of 64 kg for every
additional 1,000 kg above this weight.

This would suggest a minimum
estimated takeoff weight of 42,148 kg.

The actual load-sheet was not located at the accident site nor has a copy been located
elsewhere.

The flight plan office filed the flight plan at about 20:30hrs but sent a
report to the DGAC regional office giving details of the incident, stating that under the
regulations the office was not empowered to reject the submission

[JT8D]

Rilasciato il Final Report, per ora solo in spagnolo:

http://www.aerocivil.gov.co/autoridad-d ... on=default

"Inappropriate planning and execution of the flight with an amount of fuel that did not include any fuel for a diversion from destination to an alternate airport, any contingency, any reserve, the required minimum fuel after landing as would have been required by regulations for the type of international flight performed by CP-2933.

The four engines shut down in sequence while the aircraft descended towards the holding pattern at GEMLI as result of depletion of fuel.

Inadequate decision making within the operator's management resulting in lack of assurance of operational safety.

Loss of situational awareness and inadequate decision making by the crew which maintained their fixation to complete the flight with an extremely limited amount of fuel. The crew was aware of the low level of remaining fuel, however, did not take corrective actions required, e.g. to land at an aerodrome and replenish the fuel."

(http://avherald.com/h?article=4a16583c/0017&opt=0)

Paolo