Air India 787 Crash (Thread Generico)

[sigmet]

A quanto ne so è difficile per non dire impossibile che possano sfuggire punti non testati. Il problema è cosa succede nella gestione del problema. Nel caso in esame possiamo essere sicuri che sia stata testata (o meglio, simulata) la combinazione corrispondente allo spegnimento contemporaneo dei due motori mentre che so, l'aereo ha uno specifico assetto (sempreché questo sia preso in conto dal programma)...

Il processo di certificazione avviene passando per tre fasi ovvero :pianificazione (piani del software e quality assurance) , sviluppo (, scrittura codici, verifica e tracciabiltà) e validazione ( compliance del software e review dei documenti per il famoso DO178 C). Solo a questo punto il sistema puo' essere certificato (Type certificate) .
Questo in parole molto povere per descrivere quali siano gli step e le problematiche che sorgono dal momento in cui si fa gestire ad un computer l'intero sistema avionico suscettibile di milioni di interazioni a differenza della strumentazione anni 80 dove erano i singoli componenti ad essere certificati e non tutto l'ambaradan..

[Moth]

Grazie, ottimo a sapersi. Non ho mai trovato materiale su questi argomenti ma perché non ho mai cercato a fondo.

[airplane]

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B787 Air India Crash

(AVH Tutorial)
Ranting against the (Tutorial) author is inappropriate
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(By xxx ) In the comments section (AVH Tutorial) I see a lot of ranting against the author of this editorial.
Some even try to prescribe what the author is not allowed to publish on his own website.

This is rather disturbing to me, in particular as:

1) In the beginning of the editorial it is clearly stated that this is a personal opinion, which the author is
certainly allowed to express!
cite: "Let me summarize my own opinion on this preliminary report and provide my reasons"

2) Using an editorial, the author purposely separated his declared personal opinions (aka. speculations) from
the ordinary article with the accident report. Such an editorial is not supposed to be purely factual (see 1).

3) To my understanding, the AV Herald has been built up and maintained by the author himself, which
includes countless hours of his personal time. No-one else has the right to prescribe what he can or cannot publish.
Any kind of attempts for information control (or even censorship) are inappropriate.

While readers are certainly allowed to provide feedback and own opinions (that may or may not disprove
the author's opinions), IMHO some of the comments go way too far.

>This is my personal opinion, (your mileage may vary).


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(NO Comment)
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[musicaldoc]

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>B787 Air india AI171 Crash

(AVH) Editoriale,
Questa è solo La Parte Iniziale:
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Editorial on India B788 at Ahmedabad on Jun 12th 2025, lost height shortly after takeoff, no thrust reported

There is a war of beliefs hitting the world following the crash of Air India's Boeing 787-8 VT-ANB in Ahmedabad on Jun 12th 2025, see our actual coverage at Crash: India B788 at Ahmedabad on Jun 12th 2025, lost height shortly after takeoff, no thrust reported.

One large part of people believe especially following the release of the preliminary report, it had been a deliberate act to crash the aircraft by one of the pilots and based on some unconfirmed and premature newspaper report even point towards the Captain of the flight, another part believe it might have been an accidental flip of the fuel switches, others believe the crash might have been caused by a technical failure.

Let me summarize my own opinion on this preliminary report and provide my reasons:

I believe, that the fuel switches have been moved indeed into CUTOFF and 10 seconds later back to RUN by one of the pilots.
However, not to crash the aircraft but in an attempt to RESCUE the aircraft in accordance with the memory checklist items for dual engine failure.

I believe, the engine run downs began prior to the fuel switch signal transitioning to CUTOFF and the crew reacted correctly according to the memory items for dual engine failure, which require the crew to move both fuel switches to CUTOFF, wait, then bring them back to RUN in order to reset both Engine Electronic Controls (EEC) and also force a switch to the other channel of each EEC in order to relight at least one if not both engines.

Now, how do I get to this opinion? Let me first summarize some of the relevant Boeing documentation, then provide my observations.
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(AVH) Editoriale,
Questa è solo La Parte finale:
-----------------------------------

SUMMARY

It is therefore obvious that even on the base of the preliminary report the cause of this crash is anything but clear, any conclusion particularly pertinent the fuel switches and unintentional or intentional malicious human activity is completely premature.

As often happens, the humans in the cockpit can no longer defend themselves, and thus become all too easily the scapegoats in the conflict of interest between living parties such as designers, producers, makers, regulators, monitors, airlines, safety departments, dispatchers, maintenance personnel, ground personnel, and even investigators. As such, I always stand by the flight crew until their fault is proven or all other possible causes have been proven to be ruled out.

The investigation principles therefore are clear: rule out all technical possibilities as the cause of an occurrence, only then look at the possibilities for human (intentional or unintentional) action to be the cause.

India's AIB as well as India's Ministry of Transport were sent a copy of this editorial beforehand but did not comment nor did they answer questions to clarify the sequence of events.
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Ps.

Questo Editoriale pare sia “sotto un Fuoco di fila”;

Perciò, ho voluto dare un’occhiata, ma, ho visto
solo la parte iniziale e la parte finale.

Su queste due parti dell’editoriale, non vedo
niente di strano, anzi sono ponderate.
(Poi con calma lo leggerò tutto).
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ASSOLUTAMENTE d'accordo con te, il vero unico problema onnipresente sui social è che non si accettano pareri personali altrui, perché la maggior parte di chi ha tempo da perdere sui social lo fa per sparare sentenze assolutistiche, quindi non comprende che qualcuno gentilmente possa esprimere una propria opinione, anche se lo sottolinea che è a titolo personale.

Si chiama proiezione in psicologia/psichiatria, vedi nell'altro quello che invece sei tu.

[airplane]

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>B787 AIR INDIA CRASH

"PARE ...SI RITORNA ALL’INIZIO"
(ACQUA BRUTTA BESTIA)
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They find likely E/E Bay flooding;

Very interesting, since there was a “New AD”
against E/E Bay insulation
Just days after the Air india AI171 Crash .


Ps.
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[sigmet]

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Very interesting, since there was a “New AD”
against E/E Bay insulation [/b]
Just days after the Air india AI171 Crash .


Ps.
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Non mi risulta. Di quale AD parli?
Quale e' la fonte?

[airplane]

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>(AVH) EDITORIAL

"GIRA E RIGIRA, SPUNTA SEMPRE":
(L’ACQUA BRUTTA BESTIA)
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By Captain (XXXXX) Good (AVH) Editorial, (Simxxx).
A big thing that supports your theory is a lack of definitive timestamps after liftoff.
Every event before then has an exact timestamp.

We know we already had a data bus problem. An MEL ed "Core Network" deferred item in the logbook.
From my readings, I have gathered that there's 2 Core Network Cabinets in the hell hole (E/E Bay)
that SHARE THE SAME ARINC data bus with:

Remote Power Distribution System (RPDS)
Generator/Bus Power Control Unit (GCU/BPCU)
Landing Gear Indication and Control
Thrust Management Function
Flight Management Function
Pax internet/entertainment system
EAFR flight data recorder inputs

Let's hypothesize that one Common Core Network is already dead from water leakage
from the overhead lav AD. This could explain why the pax internet system was videoed t
o be unusable on the previous leg.
Now Horstroad's MEL book says you can still dispatch with one Core Network inop.
So what happen's if the other one fails at liftoff after water sloshes through it?

I think you'll lose:
EAFR flight data recorder inputs = no timestamps for events Gear retract function
Thrust Management Function = UHT (Uncommanded High Thrust AD.)

Each EEC spots N2 overspeed and will close the metered fuel valve on the ground or in the air.
Corrections by anyone are invited. An interesting primer of how the Core Network works is here:
Seeearch: reverse-engineers-perspective-on-the B787-51-days-airworthiness-directive/
(All my posts are just my opinions only,
and I could be wrong about everything.)
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Ps.